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From Soft Power Policy to Academic 
Diplomacy: The “Belt and Road Initiative” 
in EU–China Internationalisation of the 
Higher Education System
Manuel PEREZ-GARCIA and Oriol NIERGA
This article analyses the higher education systems in the European Union (EU) 
and China, and the influence of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, yidai yilu) on 
the implementation, development and reforms of an international agenda. It also 
takes into consideration the development of EU–China cooperation in education 
and academia through research and scientific programmes launched in recent years, 
as well as the role of some key institutions such as the Confucius Institutes. To this 
end, the aim is to analyse China’s “soft power” policy and its link with the novel 
concept of “academic diplomacy” introduced in this article to describe the 
engagement and academic international cooperation between the EU and China. 
Such reforms and promotion of collaboration with the EU have ultimately 
promoted China’s influence and visibility in the global arena. 
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, China has recorded unprecedented economic growth that 
has boosted its global influence. It has been gradually adopting the behaviour, attitudes 
and responsibilities of traditional great powers in the context of increasing multipolarity. 
Along with its economic “renaissance”, China has become an active international 
player, spreading its growing power beyond its borders. The implications of China’s 
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rise in world politics and international relations are a pervasive topic in academia, 
with repercussions in numerous areas of study. 
Today, in the early 21st century, China is developing several strategies to 
consolidate its political and economic power in the international arena and to secure 
its economic growth for the following decades. “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR, yidai 
yilu), also known as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) is Beijing’s jewel in the crown. 
This expansive strategy, which involves more than 60 countries, intends to foster 
economic integration throughout Eurasia and regions of Africa and even Latin America. 
It is Beijing’s latest and most ambitious attempt to show its commitment to gain a 
more hegemonic role in the international community through the globalisation of its 
economy and the internationalisation of its culture and values.1 
China has become aware that, in current international relations, the application 
of a “soft power” policy is more pragmatic, as this tool allows countries to pursue their 
strategies in international politics by using non-coercive means. Therefore, it has 
deployed several instruments and reforms to expand its political clout beyond its 
borders, using means such as culture, language and a form of “soft power” policy 
applied to academia—the so-called “academic diplomacy”—for such purposes. For 
more than a decade, Beijing has been able to build a strong and loyal network of 
Confucius Institutes (CIs), which act as cultural embassies in more than 140 countries. 
Chinese universities have become active players by adopting reforms and opening their 
faculties to foreign students and scholars, and several have climbed to the top tier of 
the world’s university rankings.2
Chinese political elites recognise that the current international order is eminently 
designed, shaped and dominated by the Western perspective, and that China must 
strive to promote and defend itself beyond its borders, and nurture the Western 
community’s understanding of China’s world view and values. Beijing also aims to 
explain to other countries the positive aspects of the Chinese economy and society, 
since scholars, as well as the political circles in China perceive that there is a lack of 
understanding about China in the West. The narrative that government officials intend 
to promote abroad is that China’s rise as an economic and political superpower does 
not constitute a threat to other countries. On the contrary, the goal is to accentuate 
China’s role as a peaceful power in an increasingly multipolar world, as well as to open 
windows of unprecedented opportunity for cooperation and common development. 
“Harmonious” coexistence, as an abstract and vague concept of the current neo-
Confucian policy of the Chinese government, is always available to eradicate negative 
1 Manuel Perez-Garcia, “The Global Dimensions of ‘One Belt, One Road’ Strategy in China–Latin 
America International Relations: Toward a Sustainable Economic Growth Model”, China and Latin 
America in Transition: Policy Dynamics, Economic Commitments, and Social Impacts, ed. Cui Shoujun and 
Manuel Perez- Garcia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 131–56.
2 See Times Higher Education, World University Rankings 2021, at <https://www.timeshighereducation.
com/world-university-rankings/2021/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/
stats> [25 October 2021]. 
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images of China. As was the neo-Confucian revival during the Song dynasty, the 
Chinese government has implemented neo-Confucian rules and pragmatism in recent 
years to maintain a regime of rigid obedience to the ruler that aims to eradicate any 
type of internal frictions or external (Western) interference in China’s political affairs. 
This however has not prevented the Chinese government and political leaders from 
abandoning the ideals of Marxism-Leninism to promote the so-called “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” as a means of national protectionism.3 These ideas are 
summarised under the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, namely (i) mutual 
respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) mutual non-aggression; 
(iii) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (iv) equality and cooperation 
for mutual benefit; and (v) peaceful co-existence, to guide China’s international relations. 
Postmodernism has developed a type of international relations theory of the 
relationships between Western and Eastern powers in which cultural structures and 
values reinforce the credibility, policy-making and international perception of hegemonic 
powers.4 Cultural diplomacy and internationalism through the higher education system 
are the most effective instruments to expand and project a positive image of hegemonic 
powers in the international arena.5 In the case of China, growing nationalism and the 
reinforcement of patriotism through history and culture have demonstrated to world 
powers China’s unique characteristics as a long-lasting civilisation.6 Confucius Institutes 
are a tool of critical importance for China’s international projection as an institutional 
instrument to consolidate its domestic policies and national unification.7
World leaders and businessmen educated in prestigious Western universities have 
a higher tendency of embracing hegemonic Western world views in international 
relations and economics. In the case of the United States, world leaders and citizens 
who participated in the Fulbright programs declare a fondness for the United States 
in cultural, socio-economic and political terms, demonstrating that international higher 
3 Alan T. Wood, Limits to Autocracy: From Sung Neo-Confucianism to a Doctrine of Political Rights 
(Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 1995), p. ix; and Ian Wilson, “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics: China and the Theory of the Initial Stage of Socialism”, Australian Journal of Political 
Science 24, no. 1 (2007): 77–84.
4 As cited in Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice”, The New Public 
Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 
p. 4.
5 Geoffrey Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy, 1st ed. (Oxford: Polity Press, 2010), p. 124.
6 Manuel Perez-Garcia, “Introduction: Current Challenges of Global History in East Asian Historiographies”, 
in Global History and New Polycentric Approaches: Europe, Asia and the Americas in a World Network System, 
ed. Manuel Perez-Garcia and Lucio de Sousa (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 1–17.
7 Yuan Zhenjie, Guo Junwanguo and Zhu Hong, “Confucius Institutes and the Limitations of China’s 
Global Cultural Network”, China Information 30, no. 3 (October 2016): 334–56; Christopher R. Hughes, 
“Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the Cultural”, Issues 
and Studies 50, no. 4 (December 2014): 45–83; and Zhou Ying and Sabrina Luk, “Establishing Confucius 
Institutes: A Tool for Promoting China’s Soft Power?”, Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (March 
2016): 628–42.
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education programmes contribute to promoting the image of the country.8 Meanwhile, 
only a handful of recent international leaders, mainly those from partner countries of 
BRI such as the presidents of Ethiopia and Kazakhstan, have studied in Chinese 
universities. This may partially explain why, over recent decades, China has launched 
several reforms in its academic system, opening its universities to attract more 
international students and scholars, and increasing its cooperation in the education 
field with other nations, as is the case with the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEEC) discussed below. 
China’s launch of the Project 211 and Project 985 in 1995 and 1998, respectively, 
was aimed at modernising its higher education system. At the time, Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin stressed that “China must have a number of world-class universities”.9 
In the 1990s, Beijing also established several programmes to attract new talent from 
other countries, such as the Hundred Talents Program (which started in 1994 and is 
designed to bring high-level scientists from different backgrounds to conduct research 
in China); the National Outstanding Youth Fund (established in March 1994 with 
the aim of funding young researchers below the age of 45 who work in research 
institutes and universities); and the Changjiang Scholars Program (launched in August 
1998 to attract, select and form a group of researchers at the global level, the goal of 
which is to initiate advanced investigations in all higher-education fields).10 As a result, 
China is the one of the most popular destinations for international students. In 2018, 
according to official data from the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and the UK Council for International Student Affairs (UKCISA), China 
hosted 492,185 foreigners studying at its universities, surpassed only by the United 
States with 1,094,792 foreign students in 2017/2018, and higher than the United 
Kingdom with 458,490 foreign students in 2017/2018.11 By the end of 2020, there 
were 2,332 educational joint ventures established between Chinese and overseas 
education institutions, 1,230 of which offered higher education programmes.12 Among 
them are renowned institutions such as Duke University, the University of Nottingham 
8 Patti McGill Peterson, “Diplomacy and Education: A Changing Global Landscape”, International Higher 
Education, no. 75 (Spring 2014): 2.
9 Zhao Litao and Zhu Jinjing, “China’s Higher Education Reform: What Has Not Been Changed?”, 
East Asian Policy 12, no. 4 (2010): 121.
10 Manuel Perez-Garcia, “Internacionalización y reformas del sistema de educación superior en China” 
(Internationalisation and Reforms of Higher Education in China), Revista Problemas del Desarrollo 
(Problemas del Desarrollo, Latin American Journal of Economics) 187, (October–December 2016): 49.
11 Chris Parr, “A Two-way Street: Why China is Not Just a Student Departure Lounge Anymore”, The 
Pie News, 20 April 2018, at <https://thepienews.com/analysis/international-students-in-china-increasingly-
diverse/> [7 January 2021]; “International Student Statistics: UK Higher Education”, UK Council for 
International Student Affairs (UKCISA), 12 December 2019, at <https://www.ukcisa.org.uk/Research--
Policy/Statistics/International-student-statistics-UK-higher-education> [7 January 2021]; and “Enrolment 
Trends”, Open Doors, 2020, at <https://opendoorsdata.org/data/international-students/enrollment-trends/> 
[7 January 2021].
12 “China Has Over 2,000 International Joint-venture Schools”, Xinhuanet, 22 December 2020, at 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/22/c_139610195.htm> [7 January 2020].
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and New York University, all of which had set up campuses in China. Moreover, six 
Mainland universities have managed to attain a ranking in the world’s top 100,13 and 
most, if not all of them, recruit foreign lecturers and researchers, as well as Chinese 
scholars who have obtained diplomas overseas. Arguably, Chinese universities are 
therefore becoming global actors aiming to compete with their overseas counterparts. 
In this context, the BRI is intended to facilitate the flow of both inbound and 
outbound students to/from China, since this comprehensive initiative aims to foster 
economic, social and cultural exchanges among over 60 countries that participate in 
it. From 2004 to 2016, the number of international students in China grew fourfold 
and that from BRI countries increased eightfold. In 2012, before the BRI was launched, 
students from these countries represented less than 53 per cent of all international 
students in China; in 2016, they accounted for 61 per cent.14 China pledged to reserve 
10,000 scholarships annually for students from countries participating in the BRI to 
fund study programmes in the country. But this strategy is not limited to only BRI-
participating nations. According to The Economist, China’s Ministry of Education 
budgeted 3.3 billion yuan in 2018 (16 per cent higher than the previous year) for 
international students who receive essential subsidies.15 Yet, it remains to be seen to 
what extent the COVID-19 crisis and its repercussions on international mobility will 
affect the flow of students and researchers between Europe and China, and whether 
the trend observed over the last decade will continue in the post-pandemic world.
However, such internationalisation and reforms in the higher education system 
confront several factors that seem to pull in another direction. The Communist Party 
of China (CPC) is also conscious that education is a key element to build and control 
the so-called “harmonious society”. Chinese President Xi Jinping, who will be in power 
for more than two mandates due to the 2018 amendment of China’s Constitution, 
stated at the CPC’s 19th Congress in 2017 that “government, military, society and 
schools—north, south, east and west—the Party is leader of all”.16 Furthermore, a year 
earlier, Xi claimed that Chinese universities must be the stronghold of the Party and 
the communist system.17 Xi’s statement has translated into tighter control of domestic 
public education, as well as joint ventures between Chinese and overseas universities, 
13 “World University Rankings”, QS World University Rankings, n.d., at <https://www.topuniversities.
com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2020> [2 December 2020]; and Emily Feng, “Beijing 
Vies for Greater Control of Foreign Universities in China”, Financial Times, 19 November 2017, at 
<https://www.ft.com/content/09ecaae2-ccd0-11e7-b781-794ce08b24dc> [30 December 2020].




16 Emily Feng, “Ideological Purge Hits China Universities with Western Ties”, Financial Times, 25 April 
2017, at <https://www.ft.com/content/8a7552d8-1f68-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9> [30 January 2021].
17 Tom Phillips, “China Universities Must Become Communist Party ‘Strongholds’, Says Xi Jinping”, 
The Guardian, 9 December 2016, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/09/china-universities-
must-become-communist-party-strongholds-says-xi-jinping/> [20 January 2021].
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both aiming to halt the propagation of Western values.18 As a matter of fact, Beijing 
has revived the teaching of orthodox Marxist-Leninist values by faculty members and 
has established CPC departments in some universities.19 In addition, China’s increased 
economic and political influence has also had implications for academic publications, 
with removal of sensitive articles from website repositories.20 This is occurring in a 
context of Chinese nationalism on the rise. Moreover, Chinese higher education still 
faces endemic problems that hinder its comprehensive internationalisation because 
incentives and labour conditions to attract overseas scholars to Chinese universities 
are still comparatively poor in relation to other, more developed countries. 
The European Union (EU) and China have been strengthening their collaboration 
in education over the last decade. For example, the EU–China High-Level People-to-
People Dialogue (HPPD) was launched in 2012 and, in 2016, the China–EU Education 
Ministers Conference took place in Beijing. In 2020, the EU and China released a 
joint press statement at the fifth EU–China HPPD, pledging that “both sides agreed 
to further promote two-way student and researcher mobility on the basis of reciprocity”, 
and that this could be achieved by “developing links between Erasmus + opportunities 
and support from Chinese Government Scholarships and other available resources”.21 
The EU has also been actively promoting culture as an important soft power 
element. In 2007, the European Commission (EC) launched a “European agenda for 
culture in a globalising world”, which included the notion of promoting culture in 
its external policy.22 In 2015, the Council of the EU advocated preparatory action on 
a “strategic approach to culture in the EU’s external relations”.23 In 2016, the global 
strategy for the EU’s foreign and security policy set “cultural diplomacy” as a new field 
for its joint external action24 and a cultural diplomacy platform was established, which 
became the cultural relations platform (CRP) in 2020.
In this regard, the EC and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy clearly acknowledge the role of education in external 
relations. Their 2016 joint communication “Towards an EU strategy for International 
18 Feng, “Ideological Purge Hits China Universities with Western Ties”.
19 Nectar Gan, “Chinese Universities Tighten Ideological Control of Teaching Staff”, South China Morning 
Post, 28 August 2017, at <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2108597/china-
universities-tighten-ideological-control-teaching> [30 January 2021]; and Feng, “Ideological Purge Hits 
China Universities with Western Ties”.
20 Christopher Balding, “China Looks at Western Universities and Smells Weakness”, Foreign Policy, 24 
August 2017, at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/24/china-bullies-western-universities-because-they-
let-it/> [31 January 2021].
21 European Commission, “Joint Press Statement Following the 5th EU–China High-Level People-to-
People Dialogue”, 10 November 2020, at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
STATEMENT_20_2080> [29 December 2020].
22 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards 
an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations”, JOIN(2016) 29 final, 8 June 2016, p. 2.
23 Ibid.
24 European External Action Service (EEAS), “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A 
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, April 2016, p. 49.
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Cultural Relations”, which included cultural diplomacy as its third pillar, states that 
“the EU’s mobility and inter-university cooperation programmes are invaluable 
instruments for establishing lasting academic and cultural ties, which simultaneously 
promote the EU in partner countries”.25 According to this document, throughout the 
2014–20 period, the EU would promote the mobility of researchers, the exchange of 
students and alumni and EU studies networks. For example, the Marie Skłodowska-
Curie Actions programme pledged to “enable 15,000 researchers from outside Europe 
to begin or pursue their careers in Europe”.26
This article analyses China’s strategy to apply “soft power” policy and its derived 
concept in the educational sector, i.e. “academic diplomacy”, and assesses the extent 
of internationalisation of China’s higher education system and its cooperation with 
Europe. Such internationalisation of the higher education system is in line with China’s 
rise as an economic and political powerhouse, and the policy of “internationalisation 
with Chinese characteristics” (Zhongguo tese). This article also argues that despite the 
increase in cooperation between foreign, mainly European, and Chinese universities 
and the growing number of international students pursuing their degrees in China, 
the overall trend seems to conflict with a comprehensive internationalisation of China’s 
higher education and tends towards neo-nationalism. In other words, research 
institutions and universities apply the new narratives and neo-Confucian policies 
implemented by China’s Ministry of Education,27 striving to infuse China’s higher 
education system with patriotic spirit but also aiming in some way to internationalise 
it.28 This article will contribute to the understanding of the current situation of 
universities and academia in China, as well as raise awareness of the challenges and 
opportunities that higher education faces in the current context.
There exists a research gap in the field of internationalisation of China’s higher 
education. Scholarship has focused primarily on the development of the higher 
education system for the period between China’s times of isolation and today,29 but 
analysis of the internationalisation of the Chinese higher education system through 
25 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards 
an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations”, p. 14.
26 Ibid., p. 15.
27 Manuel Perez-Garcia, “From Eurocentrism to Sinocentrism: The New Challenges in Global History”, 
European Journal of Scientific Research 119, no. 3 (2014): 339.
28 Charles Holcombe (2001) as cited in Manuel Perez-Garcia, “Internacionalización y reformas del sistema 
de educación superior en China” (Internationalisation and Reforms of Higher Education in China), p. 45.
29 Chen Linhan and Huang Danyan, “Internationalization of Chinese Higher Education”, Higher Education 
Studies 3, no. 1 (2013): 92–105; Xi Y., Guo J. and Li H., Study on the Characteristics and Strategies of 
the Internationalization of Chinese Universities (Beijing: People’s Publishing House of China, 2010); Mao 
Liuri and Shen Guanquan, eds., Zhongguo jiaoyu tongshi (Comprehensive History of Chinese Education), 
vol. 4 (Jinan: Shandong Education Press, 1988), pp. 151–62; Yang Rui, “China’s Strategy for the 
Internationalization of Higher Education: An Overview”, Frontiers of Education in China 9, no. 2 (June 
2014): 151–62; Paul S.N. Lee, “The Rise of China and Its Contest for Discursive Power”, Global Media 
and China 1, no. 1–2 (June 2016): 102–20.
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the concept of “academic diplomacy” is scarce. In this article, the authors’ main 
argument is based on the underlying logics of internationalisation of higher education 
in China and the engagement with Europe and international partners under the BRI. 
This study, therefore, aims to bridge the gap by analysing the influence of the BRI 
strategy on Chinese universities and its implementation. This article is structured as 
follows. First, a literature review gathers relevant theoretical background related to the 
importance of the “soft power” policy, cultural ties and the concept of “academic 
diplomacy” applied to current international relations. Second, the article focuses on 
the internationalisation of the Chinese higher education system and examines to what 
extent its “soft power” objectives have been successful. In the concluding section, the 
authors briefly describe the political control over Chinese education and its impact 
on the internationalisation of universities.
SHIFTING THE BALANCE OF POWER THROUGH  
“SOFT POWER” POLICY AND “ACADEMIC DIPLOMACY” 
The consequences of China’s rise are a pervasive topic widely discussed in academia 
since the country started emerging as a global power, changing the balance in world 
politics. Its rise represents a reshaping of the global order that has existed for decades 
and has tremendous economic, political and social implications beyond China’s borders. 
As Lee points out, “historically, the rise of a new power often ended in wars that were 
used to alter the status quo”.30 Nevertheless, even though the PRC is not in favour of 
some features of the current international system, which was mainly designed by the 
United States and its allies in the post-World War II period, China has prospered and 
become more engaged with the international system since its implementation of 
economic reforms in 1978 and, as a matter of fact, is one of the most fervent advocates 
for globalisation today.
Hans Morgenthau31 identifies nine elements of national power, namely geography, 
natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national 
character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government, 
of which the latter four can be regarded as “‘soft’ side power”.32 In the current 
international system, the use of soft diplomatic tools to pursue desired goals is less 
costly and more efficient. While the exercise of power may be defined as the capacity 
to obtain desired outcomes through coercion,33 the exercise of soft power involves 
forms of psychological persuasion and non-physical violence, with the aim of co-opting 
people to obtain wanted results.
30 Lee, “The Rise of China and Its Contest for Discursive Power”.
31 As cited in Lee, “The Rise of China and Its Contest for Discursive Power”.
32 Ibid.
33 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy”, Cultural Diplomacy Magazine, Endnote, 
Winter 2010.
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This explains why many countries have focused their recent diplomatic efforts 
on increasing the capabilities and effectiveness of this sort of diplomacy involving 
psychological persuasion. Chinese President Xi Jinping stated in 2014 that “we should 
increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate 
China’s message to the world”.34 China has realised that economic and military powers 
are not enough and that they need to be combined with soft power.35 By contrast, 
former High Representative of the [European] Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy Federica Mogherini emphasised the importance of the EU’s soft power during 
a debate at the European Parliament on the EU Global Strategy, but she stressed the 
need to complement it with other tools when carrying out its external policy: 
We are also starting to explore new fields of common action, such as energy, 
diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and economic diplomacy, but the strategy also 
states very clearly that what we are so good at, soft power, is not enough in 
these times. Obviously, nobody calls into question the fact that soft power is 
and will remain the centre of our external action, also because we are the best 
in the world at soft power.36
A distinction between soft power based on traditional and on public diplomacy should 
be made. The former style of diplomacy is related to state officials and the latter to 
the public in general associated with foreign affairs, acting through non-formal 
institutions.37 Public diplomacy should also be defined as both direct relations among 
individuals and official institutions,38 as well as government management of 
communication in foreign affairs; and public diplomacy related to culture and higher 
education systems for academic and scientific cooperation involves projecting national 
goals and policies in the form of “academic diplomacy”.39 
Cultural diplomacy has been considered as a subcategory of public diplomacy, 
and most governments implement it merely to engage in communication through 
cultural values and ideals with partner countries.40 A country’s hegemonic role in world 
affairs is partially sustained by cultural transfers.41 Such diplomacy is founded upon 
34 Eleanor Albert, “China’s Big Bet on Soft Power”, The Economist, 9 February 2018, at <https://www.
cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power> [30 December 2020].
35 “Is China’s Soft Power Strategy Working?”, China Power, 27 February 2016 (updated 26 August 2020), 
at <https://chinapower.csis.org/is-chinas-soft-power-strategy-working/> [7 January 2021]. 
36 European Parliament, “A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (Debate)”, 6 July 
2016, at <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-8-2016-07-06-ITM-010_EN.html/> 
[30 December 2020].
37 Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy”, p. 5.
38 As cited in Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy”, p. 11.
39 Tuch as cited in Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy”, pp. 11–2.
40 Nye, Jr., “Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy”.
41 Simon Murden, “Culture in World Affairs”, in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations, 5th ed., ch. 25, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
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the expansion of national ideals through cultural and popular forms with the goal of 
implementing foreign policies and national agendas.42 As public diplomacy is 
government-driven, other countries often label it as “propaganda” for its attempts to 
influence public opinion by portraying a positive image of the country that emits the 
message.
The notion of cultural diplomacy has been adopted by institutions such as the 
EU. The 2016 joint communication “Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural 
Relations” stated that “[t]he EU’s mobility and inter-university cooperation programmes 
are invaluable instruments for establishing lasting academic and cultural ties, which 
simultaneously promote the EU in partner countries”.43 In this regard, the document 
asserts that:
The EU is strongly committed to promoting a global order based on peace, the 
rule of law, freedom of expression, mutual understanding and respect for 
fundamental rights. Accordingly, promoting diversity through international 
cultural relations is an important part of the EU’s role as a global actor.44
Within cultural diplomacy, the use of education to pursue national strategies is 
particularly relevant. The concept of “academic diplomacy” is intrinsically related to 
the expansion and consolidation of foreign policies within the academic world.45 
Academic diplomacy could be defined as a form of visible diplomacy through cultural 
exchange programmes that basically host outreach activities on university campuses 
for the general public. In addition, exchange of faculty staff with international partner 
universities is also considered academic diplomacy. Thus, the idea of academic diplomacy 
is to institutionalise national policies within academia and at the same time 
internationalise departments, faculties and universities.46
Bertelsen claims that universities have been traditionally overlooked in international 
relations literature on transnational actors, despite their importance in moving 
information, money and people across state boundaries.47 Universities exercise “moral 
and cultural suasion” through the exchange of ideas and the promotion of scientific 
42 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy: Power, 
Distance, and the Promise of Civil Society”, in Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, ed. Jessica C.E. 
Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013).
43 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards 
an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations”, p. 14.
44 Ibid., p. 2.
45 Thomas Adam and Charlotte A. Lerg, “Diplomacy on Campus: The Political Dimensions of Academic 
Exchange in the North Atlantic”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 13, no. 4 (November 2015): 299–310.
46 Ibid., p. 302.
47 Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, “Private Universities, the State and Soft Power: The American University 
of Beirut and the Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth”, Aalborg University, 2017, p. 5.
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critical research and thinking, and therefore they play a crucial role as non-state actors.48 
Such a capacity has been defined as “university soft power” which is understood as 
the “behavior by outsiders to the universities, which is desired by the universities and 
based on attraction or co-optation”.49 Deodato and Borkowska cite the example of the 
countries of the Warsaw Pact, which were invited to join the EU Tempus and Erasmus 
programmes long before their accession to the union.50 The British House of Lords 
acknowledged the importance of education in soft power, claiming that UK universities 
are “centres for shaping the thoughts of the future elite in the world”.51 The committee 
recommended that the British government remove students from its net migration 
targets. According to its report, 95% per cent of international students who graduated 
in the United Kingdom are positively oriented towards Britain, “develop an awareness 
and respect for UK culture, governance, institutions and history” and also gain exposure 
to “UK norms and cultural values”.52
In a nutshell, academic diplomacy is one of the soft power tools that any 
government may use to create and foster “strategic narratives”, which are tools for 
governments and other political actors to shape the perceptions, beliefs and behaviour 
of both domestic and international actors.53 If governments manage to create compelling 
strategic narratives in a comprehensive and attractive form to foreign powers and global 
actors, then the said nation may achieve its goals when other infrastructural capabilities 
fail to implement in the international arena the government’s strategies and image.54
NEW “ACADEMIC DIPLOMACY” AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
FOR THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CHINA’S HIGHER 
EDUCATION SYSTEM UNDER THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
The application of “academic diplomacy” in international relations dates back to the 
early 20th century. This concept employs cultural and educational means to influence 
values and perceptions to elicit other societies’ willingness to cooperate by fostering 
goodwill among them. It developed as a political instrument in the interwar period, 
48 Ettore Deodato and Iwona Borkowska, “Universities as Actors and Instruments in Diplomacy. The 
Academic Soft Power Potential”, Valdai Papers, no. 8, Valdai Discussion Club, December 2014, p. 5; 
and Nye as cited in Bertelsen, “Private Universities, the State and Soft Power”, p. 6.
49 Bertelsen, “Private Universities, the State and Soft Power”, p. 7.
50 Deodato and Borkowska, “Universities as Actors and Instruments in Diplomacy. The Academic Soft 
Power Potential”, p. 5.
51 David Matthews, “Universities ‘Shape Future Elites’ through Soft Power, Say Peers”, Times Higher 
Education, 28 March 2014, at <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/universities-shape-future-
elites-through-soft-power-say-peers/2012327.article> [6 January 2021].
52 Ibid.
53 Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle, as cited in Falk Hartig, “Communicating China to the World: 
Confucius Institutes and China’s Strategic Narratives”, Politics 35, no. 3–4 (2015): 248.
54 Antoniades, O’Loughlin and Miskimmon, as cited in Hartig, “Communicating China to the World”, 
p. 248.
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expanded during the Cold War and has become significant since the 1990s.55 The 
United States has been the greatest exponent of academic diplomacy. In the 1930s the 
US Department of State set up the Division of Cultural Relations with the aim of 
establishing a programme for cultural and academic exchange with Latin American 
countries.56 Furthermore, Washington, DC, under the auspices of the federal government, 
used this strategy to win support for its cause during the Cold War, when private 
institutions expanded American values into Europe and the Third World.57 The strategy 
motivated a cultural diplomatic race between Washington and Moscow, both attempting 
to legitimise themselves and boycotting each other on either side of the “Iron Curtain”. 
In this regard, cultural programmes and academic exchanges, along with non-official 
institutions, served as a means to promote US culture and values, in contrast to those 
imposed by the Soviet and the communist blocs.58
In the EU, one of the paramount examples of academic diplomacy is the Erasmus 
programme (the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University 
Students). The European Commission (EC) noted in its 1986 proposal to establish 
the Erasmus programme that one of the goals was “to strengthen the interaction 
between citizens in different Member States with a view to consolidating the concept 
of a People’s Europe”.59 This goal was also acknowledged in the EC’s 2020 Erasmus+ 
Programme Guide, which specified that the EC sought “the promotion of European 
values in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union”, which 
states that:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.60
The programme seemed to yield positive outcomes as student exchanges among EU 
countries can develop the knowledge of the founding of the EU and cultural diversity 
55 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “Introduction: What Are We Searching For? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents 
and the State”, in Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, ed. Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. 
Donfried (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013), p. 3.
56 Espinosa as cited in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy”, p. 14.
57 Ibid., p. 15.
58 Bill Ivey and Paula Clegget, “Cultural Diplomacy and The National Interest: In Search of a 21st-
Century Perspective”, The Curb Center for Art, Enterprise and Public Policy, 2008, p. 3.
59 European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Decision Adopting the European Community Action 
Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (Erasmus)”, Official Journal of the European Commission, 
No C 73/4, COM (85) 756 final (1985).
60 European Union, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union”, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 326/13 (2012).
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of its member states.61 This contributes to European integration as the cornerstone of 
the EU that is in accordance with the so-called “Erasmus effect”.62
Since its inception over three decades ago, Erasmus, in its different forms, has 
facilitated more than 10 million people to study abroad.63 Since 2015, the Erasmus+ 
programme has also facilitated students, researchers and staff from other parts of the 
world to participate in this programme and it launched a traineeship programme in 
2018. China has played an important role as a partner country of the Erasmus+ 
programme, accounting for 28 per cent of the programme’s international credit mobility 
budget in Asia, the largest share in the continent, between 2015 and 2018. Vietnam, 
India and Indonesia accounted for 17 per cent, 11 per cent and nine per cent, 
respectively, of the programme’s international credit mobility budget. Over the same 
period, 3,177 students moved from China to Europe and 1,973 from Europe to China. 
In addition, 36 Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degrees were selected and 234 Erasmus 
Mundus Master’s Scholarships were granted to China between 2014 and 2018.64
The Erasmus+ programme also includes capacity-building for higher education 
projects, which span from two to three years. Between 2015 and 2018, China 
participated in 114 capacity-building projects, which aim at “modernising and reforming 
higher education institutions, developing new curricula, improving governance, and 
building relationships between higher education institutions and enterprises”.65 China 
has also been involved in Jean Monnet (JM) activities, which seek to promote teaching 
and research in the field of EU studies worldwide.66 Between 2014 and 2018, 18 
projects from China were selected.67
At the national level, European countries have also used cultural and “academic 
diplomacy” to pursue their desired outcomes. The British Council is the United 
Kingdom’s main body to establish cultural and educational relations with other 
countries, while the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) is Germany’s 
counterpart for such purposes.68 The Institut Français “has sole responsibility for 
France’s cultural diplomacy” and it “is tasked with driving new ambitions for France’s 
61 Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy, 1st ed., pp. 188–9.
62 Emmanuel Sigalas, “Cross-border Mobility and European Identity: The Effectiveness of Intergroup 
Contact During the ERASMUS Year Abroad”, European Union Politics 11, no. 2 (2010): 241–65; and 
Kristine Mitchell, “Rethinking the ‘Erasmus Effect’ on European Identity”, JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 53, no. 2 (2014): 330–48.
63 “10 Million Erasmus Participants and Counting”, European Commission, 28 January 2020, at <https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_130/> [30 December 2020].
64 European Commission, “Erasmus+ for Higher Education in China”, November 2018.
65 Ibid.
66 European Commission, “Jean Monnet Actions in the Field of Higher Education”, n.d., at <https://
erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/programme-guide/part-b/jean-monnet-actions/higher-education> [25 October 
2021].
67 European Commission, “Erasmus+ for Higher Education in China”.
68 Peterson, “Diplomacy and Education”, p. 2.
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projection of soft power, helping to enhance France’s influence abroad through greater 
dialogue with other cultures through a process of listening and partnership”.69
The PRC’s first attempts to use such “soft power” can be traced back to its 
founding in 1949, when the Chinese government wanted to show the world its 
commitment to communist values. To do so, China officials participated in sport and 
cultural meetings to promote such values when visitors came to China.70 In the early 
years, the Soviet Union was the PRC’s most important partner. Despite the past 
grievances and animosity, China also had close cultural ties with Japan in the post-war 
period. In 1956, “2,000 out of a total of 5,200 visitors to China from 75 different 
countries came from Japan”.71 Besides, in the 19th and 20th centuries, China attracted 
important experts in China studies, such as H.B. Morse, J.K. Fairbank and Orville 
Schell, who aimed to study and understand the language, history, economy and politics 
of this Asian nation.72 Yet it was not until the 1970s, during Richard Nixon’s and 
Jimmy Carter’s presidencies, followed by Deng Xiaoping’s push for reforms, that China 
truly started opening up its universities to foreigners and a new generation of 
sinologists.73 However, even with the increase in the number of foreign scholars and 
experts in Chinese universities as a result of these efforts, the statistics were still low. 
In the last decade, the Chinese government has recommitted its efforts to fostering 
its international image. For example, Beijing has established cultural study centres 
around the world. However, despite these endeavours, China has yet to see a significant 
return on its investment.74 Some experts, such as the US sinologist David Shambaugh, 
have claimed that China spends approximately US$10 billion annually on maintaining 
its cultural study centres worldwide.75
Other scholars, however, have interpreted the origins of “soft power” in China 
from a different perspective. In arguing against “the prevalent impression”, Palit states 
that “soft power” applied to education and culture in China is a genuine product of 
the Chinese tradition and heritage rather than a mere imitation of the West.76 Palit 
notes that China’s emphasis on and approach of the “spread of harmony and amity” 
today have ancient Chinese origins in the Spring and Autumn period (771–476 BCE), 
69 “France’s Overseas Cultural Network”, Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères (Ministry for 
Europe and Foreign Affairs), 2015, at <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/cultural-
diplomacy/france-s-overseas-cultural-network/> [2 January 2021].
70 Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy”, p. 20.
71 Ibid.
72 Perez-Garcia, “Internacionalización y reformas del sistema de educación superior en China” 
(Internationalisation and Reforms of Higher Education in China), p. 40.
73 Ibid.
74 Albert, “China’s Big Bet on Soft Power”.
75 Ibid.
76 Parama Sinha Palit, “China’s Cultural Diplomacy: Historical Origin, Modern Methods and Strategic 
Outcomes”. China Currents Journal 12, no. 2 (2013), at <https://www.chinacenter.net/2014/china_
currents/12-2/chinas-cultural-diplomacy-historical-origin-modern-methods-and-strategic-outcomes/> [7 
January 2021].
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also known as the Hundred Schools of Thought, which “preferred diplomatic 
manoeuvring to secure state objectives and were averse to territorial expansion by 
force”.77 In addition, “[a]long with Confucianism, the doctrine of Taoism and Mohism 
also emphasized ‘universal love’ and the virtues of discussion and persuasion for solving 
problems”.78 Indeed, Hu Jintao’s concept of a “harmonious world” was inspired by 
this ancient tradition, and the Cultural Revolution (1966–77) was the only period in 
the course of China’s history that attempted to break with this past. 
In June 1978, Deng Xiaoping, who was educated in France for several years and 
had already developed ideas of policy implementation should he come into power, 
stressed that China should increase academic cooperation with foreign countries and 
send more students abroad.79 Many years after, at the 17th National Congress of the 
CPC in 2007, soft power was eventually referenced in a government policy by Hu 
Jintao. Hu claimed that the flourishing and enduring Chinese culture and civilisation 
could help to transform the nation.80 Thus, the investment in establishing Confucius 
Institutes (CIs) around the globe increased significantly.81 Compared to previous 
decades, China’s Ministry of Education is more active today as high-level government 
officials have been actively engaging with foreign, mainly EU partners, to strengthen 
scientific and academic cooperation.82 These actions go in line with the application 
of academic diplomacy in China as the means to use international education to achieve 
its political aims.83
Since the 1990s, the Chinese higher education system has become more 
international, increasing inbound and outbound flow of students. As Figure 1 shows, 
the number of foreigners completing part of their studies in China grew steadily from 
110,844 in 2004 to 492,185 in 2018. Therefore, the country almost met its target of 
hosting 500,000 international students by 2020 (Figure 1). Beijing has established 
cooperation agreements in this field with other countries and regions. Apart from the 
Erasmus+ programme, the establishment of the Euraxess Links in Beijing in 2008 is 
another example of scientific and academic cooperation between China and the EU. 
This platform, which provides information about European policies, funding for 
investigations, and international cooperation and mobility, has facilitated the exponential 
increase in cooperation between China and the EU.84 
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 “The Legacy of Overseas Study for China’s Early Leaders: Deng Xiaoping”, China.org.cn, 27 June 
2016, at <http://www.china.org.cn/china/CPC_95_anniversary/2016-06/27/content_38756438.htm> [31 
January 2021].
80 Albert, “China’s Big Bet on Soft Power”.
81 Nye, Jr., “Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy”.
82 James Paradise, “International Education: Diplomacy in China”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs. 
19, no. 1 (Fall 2012): 1.
83 Ibid., p. 2.
84 Perez-Garcia, “Internacionalización y reformas del sistema de educación superior en China” 
(Internationalisation and Reforms of Higher Education in China), p. 40.
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In addition, as highlighted by Fu,85 China is also considered a player pushing for the 
internationalisation of the EU’s higher education system. Europe is increasingly popular 
among Chinese students due to tuition costs and the flexibility of visa applications 
85 Fu Jia, “Moving Towards a Bright Future: Chinese Students in the EU”, EU–Asia at a Glance, European 
Institute for Asian Studies (February 2019): 4–5.
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offered by some European universities. According to Eurostat,86 in 2018, China 
(including Hong Kong) was overall the most important country of origin of foreign 
tertiary education graduates in the EU-27 (8.5 per cent) and in two member states, 
Germany (13.6 per cent) and Sweden (9.8 per cent). China was also the second most 
common origin of the foreign students in Ireland (12.7 per cent), France (12.1 per 
cent), Italy (7.2 per cent), the Netherlands (7.1 per cent) and Finland (8.2 per cent). 
The percentage was even higher in the United Kingdom, where Chinese students 
accounted for 30.4 per cent of its foreign tertiary education graduates.
Internationalisation of China’s Higher Education System under the Belt  
and Road Initiative 
As discussed, China has a vast geostrategic plan to act beyond its borders and the BRI 
is its priority. The strategy is to foster economic integration throughout Eurasia and 
beyond based on the creation of several economic and logistic inland and maritime 
routes. With China and Western Europe as its end points, the land route resembles 
the ancient “Silk Road” that facilitated trade and exchange of ideas and technology 
between the eastern and western shores of Eurasia. Beijing’s intention is to build a 
network of roads, railways, airports and seaports, facilitating China’s access both to 
raw materials to feed its insatiable industry and to new markets to export its goods 
and services. That said, the BRI provides a platform that facilitates not only trade, 
but also cultural exchanges. In other words, as Chinese officials have claimed, the BRI 
has brought mutual gains for participating countries and has aimed to foster economic, 
social, cultural and academic exchanges.87 
This is evident in the 2016 China–EU Education Ministers Conference, themed 
“Building the China–Europe Silk Road of Education”, held in Beijing. In his speech, 
European Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport (2016–19) Tibor 
Navracsics stressed the need for cooperation in the field of education: “At the top of 
the list, we have the EU’s Erasmus+ programme and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie 
Actions under Horizon 2020. The Chinese Scholarship Council and Hanban (also 
known as the Office of Chinese Language Council International) actions have pursued 
similar aims on the Chinese side”.88 He also reiterated the EU’s support for the network 
86 “Share of Tertiary Education Graduates from Abroad by Country of Origin for the Three Largest 
Partner Countries, 2018 (% of All Tertiary Education Graduates from Abroad)”, Eurostat, 9 November 
2020, at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Share_of_tertiary_education 
_graduates_from_abroad_by_country_of_origin_for_the_three_largest_partner_countries,_2018_(%25_
of_all_tertiary_education_graduates_from_abroad)_ET2020.png> [4 January 2020].
87 Perez-Garcia, “The Global Dimensions of ‘One Belt, One Road’ Strategy in China–Latin America 
International Relations”, pp. 131–56.
88 European Commission, “Speech of Commissioner Tibor Navracsics at the China–EU Education 
Ministers Conference “Staying Connected: Why We Need to Strengthen Our Cooperation on Education’”, 
11 October 2016, at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_3421/> [31 
December 2020]. 
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of Chinese Jean Monnet Chairs and the activities of the Chinese Jean Monnet Centres 
of Excellence, which “is enabling Chinese students to learn about the European Union 
integration in Chinese universities”.89 Navracsics also stressed that cooperation has 
gone beyond mobility and commended Chinese universities for their participation in 
joint academic projects alongside European universities: 
Just to mention a few examples, Tongji University is involved in a Joint Master[’s] 
Degree on Cinematography together with schools in Ireland, Estonia and 
Hungary. Nankai University is offering a joint Master[’]s on “Global Markets, 
Local Creativities”. Hohai University is taking part in a Master[’]s on water 
management coordinated by the University of Nice in France. And Peking 
University is one of the Chinese partners in a project coordinated by the Free 
University of Brussels on governance and academic leadership.90
On the other hand, China has also sought to increase its cooperation in education in 
Europe beyond the framework of the EU. In 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
initiated another channel to establish relations with most Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC), some of which are EU member states, through the China–CEEC 
platform (previously known as 16+1). This platform, comprising representatives from 
17 European countries which are key pieces of the BRI puzzle, meets annually in 
China.91 
Within this framework, the China–Central and Eastern European Countries 
Education Dialogues are held annually, along with the China–CEEC Educational 
Cooperation and Exchanges Exhibition. The latter was held in 2019 in Dubrovnik 
(Croatia), forming part of the “Year of China–CEEC Education and Youth Exchange” 
theme. That year, 5,418 Chinese students were studying in CEEC, while 6,188 CEEC 
students were studying in China, with 1,582 of these students receiving funding 
through Chinese government scholarships.92 The framework also includes the China–
CEEC Higher Education Institutions Consortium, which attracted participation of 
134 educational institutions from China and CEEC countries.93 In addition, the 
China–CEEC high-level think tanks symposium has met annually since 2013. In 
2017, China and CEEC launched a think tank, the China–CEE Institute, in Budapest 
to “build ties and strengthen partnerships with academic institutions and think tanks 
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 The 17 European members of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) group are: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.
92 “Romania Hosts China–CEEC Education Policy Dialogue”, Xinhuanet, 18 May 2019, at <http://
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/18/c_138067675.htm> [2 January 2020].
93 Alicja Bachulska, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova and Nina Pejić, “We the People? The Challenges 
of Societal Relations with China”, ch. 3, in Empty Shell No More: China’s Growing Footprint in Central 
and Eastern Europe, ed. Ivana Karásková (Prague: Association for International Affairs, 2020), p. 58.
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in Hungary and other Central and Eastern European countries”.94 However, “the 
multitude of seemingly high-level frameworks for cooperation associated with the 17+1 
initiative, [the BRI] as well as bilateral cooperation does not mean that their existence 
translates directly into achieving long-term goals on both sides”.95
In this regard, the ubiquitous application of multilateral platforms between China 
and the 17 European countries has attracted criticism because it has developed beyond 
the scope of the EU. Specifically, critics have pointed out the controversial nature of 
a framework that allows China to establish relations with other regions of the world, 
“given the concerns expressed about arrangements under its umbrella being in conflict 
with EU law and about a perceived erosion of EU norms, values and unity”.96 Whether 
this platform is a possible “Trojan horse” aiming to “divide and conquer” Europe has 
been the central focus of discussion.97 
As discussed earlier, the BRI and the increasing internationalisation of Chinese 
universities have already paved the way for hundreds of students to study in China. 
Scholarship programmes are Beijing’s preferred instrument for facilitating student 
exchange, since they are “a cost-effective way of cementing relationships and creating 
goodwill among future leaders”.98 In this regard, Bachulska et al. explain that “given 
increasingly restricted academic freedom at most Chinese universities, there have been 
fears of Chinese government scholarships forming a new generation of China-minded 
individuals who might not be able to critically assess Beijing’s behavior”.99 While they 
caution that this criticism seems “exaggerated”, “nurturing a China-friendly cohort 
from different world regions does seem to be one of the aims of these kinds of 
scholarship programs”.100 
Within this context, in the past decades, China managed to attract future leaders 
from other countries to study at its universities. For instance, former Ethiopian President 
Mulatu Teshome studied 12 years in Beijing at the renowned Peking University, where 
he received his bachelor’s degree in Philosophy of Political Economy and a doctorate 
94 “China Launches ‘China–CEE Institute’ Think Tank in Hungary”, China–CEE Institute, 25 April 
2017, at <http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjhz_1/t1456482.htm> [1 January 2021]; and “China–CEE 
Institute: Structure”, China–CEE Institute, n.d., at <https://china-cee.eu/structure/> [1 January 2021].
95 Bachulska, Bērziņa-Čerenkova and Pejić, “We the People? The Challenges of Societal Relations with 
China”, p. 64.
96 Gisela Grieger, “China, the 16+1 Cooperation Format and the EU”, European Parliament Research 
Service, Briefing, September 2018.
97 Eamonn Butler, “16+1: The EU’s Concerns of a Chinese ‘Trojan Horse’”, Europe Now (April 2018); 
and Richard Turcsányi, “Central and Eastern Europe’s Courtship with China: Trojan Horse within the 
EU?”, EU–Asia at a Glance, European Institute for Asian Studies (January 2014).
98 Peter Cai, “China Targets Foreign Elites in Scholarship Push”, National Interest, 29 January 2016, at 
<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-targets-foreign-elites-scholarship-push-15063> [30 
January 2021].
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in International Law.101 At the time, he experienced China’s economic opening up and 
had a grasp of the Chinese development model. According to his predecessor Negasso 
Gidada (president between 1995 and 2001), Mulatu Teshome’s “Chinese education 
played a role in informing the country’s reform policy. At present, China is Ethiopia’s 
largest investor as well as trading partner”.102 
Nevertheless, the prevailing impression that points towards a gradual 
internationalisation of Chinese universities can be misleading or, at least, inaccurate.103 
Despite the fact that Chinese universities are increasingly involved at the international 
level, facilitating the flow of foreign students and scholars, and adopting several reforms, 
they have also faced in recent years a strengthened political control from the Chinese 
government and the Party. Xi Jinping, who has held power since 2012, has reiterated 
that education plays a key role in China’s political system but that “the Party is leader 
of all”.104 He has also stressed that “adherence to the Party’s leadership is essential to 
the development of higher education in the country”.105 In this regard, not only has 
political control over Chinese higher education tightened since 2012, the government 
has also reintroduced an ideological curriculum and many universities have established 
“Xi Thought” institutes in their departments.106 In this context, the increasing 
nationalism in China is perceived as a social glue that holds together and strengthens 
the country’s cohesion.107 The government has also promoted “a new narrative [that] 
is based on China’s MoE [Ministry of Education] current neo-Confucianism project 
followed by universities and research institutions”108 with the aim of shaping China’s 
national history,109 while putting a halt to the propagation of Western values. 
101 Terje Skjerdal and Fufa Gusu, “Positive Portrayal of Sino–African Relations in the Ethiopian Press”, 
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ethiopianreview.com/index/49181> [31 January 2021]. 
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Another issue regarding China’s “academic diplomacy” is the role of the Confucius 
Institutes (CIs). The first cultural and educational centres of this type were established 
in 2004. The administration of the CIs by Hanban,110 an institution composed of 
representatives from 12 ministries and commissions within the Chinese central 
government,111 has attracted strong criticism. Hanban currently lists 112 CIs throughout 
the EU on its website.112 One of their particularities compared to the cultural institutions 
of other countries such as Germany or France is that many of the CIs are embedded 
in the campuses of foreign universities, some of which regarded hosting these institutions 
as appealing because of funding.113 There are concerns over the influence of CIs on 
academic freedom, and also on the outsourcing of discussion and research related to 
China to an institution linked to its government. In fact, Hanban controls the hiring 
and training of teachers, “who are not considered university employees and do not 
enjoy standard academic freedom protections”.114 Although most CIs operate under 
the umbrella of host universities, they have continued close ties with the Chinese 
government. Because of such controversial arrangements, several universities, such as 
the University of Chicago and Pennsylvania State University in the United States, 
McMaster University in Canada, Stockholm University in Sweden and the University 
of Lyon in France have withdrawn their agreements with the Confucius Institute.115
China has repeatedly rejected these accusations. In 2014, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs spokesperson Hua Chunying asserted that “all class and cultural activities are 
open and transparent. The Chinese side has provided teachers and teaching materials 
assistance according to requests of the US side. It has never interfered with academic 
freedom”.116
Additionally, Chinese higher education still faces other intrinsic problems when 
competing at the international level. China’s Ministry of Education introduced a reform 
in 2012 to recruit foreign faculty staff at Chinese universities, and from then on, 
foreign experts could collaborate in universities and research centres as professors or 
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investigators for short periods. Despite the growing number of international researchers 
and professors working full time in China in recent years, the total figure (excluding 
visiting professors or scholars participating in Chinese consortia and scholars from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong or Macao) remains small117 (see Table 1, Figures 2 and 3). 
TABLE 1 
Share of foreign faculty Working at Major univerSitieS in china in 2020
Total Number of Faculty Employees Proportion of Foreign Staff (%)
Peking University 2,900 0.5
Tsinghua University 3,416 1.43
Renmin University of China 3,580 0.30
Zhejiang University 3,502 0.22
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration. These statistics were compiled from the websites of the mentioned universities 
(faculties and departments) by calculating the share of foreign faculty staff working on a full-time basis (excluding 
visiting professors) of the total number of faculty employees. “Facts and Figures”, Tsinghua University, August 2020, 
at <https://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/en/About/Facts_and_Figures.htm> [15 December 2020]; “Schools and Departments”, 
Peking University, n.d., at <http://newsen.pku.edu.cn/Schools_Departments/> [15 December 2020]; Renmin University 
of China, at <http://www.ruc.edu.cn/humanities-en> [15 December 2020]; Zhejiang University, at <http://www.zju.
edu.cn/english/wcademics/list.htm#right_box_02> [15 December 2020].



















Sources: Authors’ own elaboration. These statistics were compiled from the websites of the mentioned universities 
(faculties and departments). This graph includes both Chinese and non-Chinese faculty staff. See sources from Table 
1 and <http://newsen.pku.edu.cn/Schools_Departments/> [15 December 2020].
117 Perez-Garcia, “Internacionalización y reformas del sistema de educación superior en China” 
(Internationalisation and Reforms of Higher Education in China), p. 42.
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Sources: Authors’ own elaboration. These statistics are taken from the websites of the mentioned universities (faculties 
and departments) by calculating the share of foreign faculty staff working on a full-time basis (excluding visiting 
professors) of the total number of faculty employees. See sources from Table 1 and <http://newsen.pku.edu.cn/
Schools_Departments/> [15 December 2020].
CONCLUSION
The internationalisation of China’s higher education system and the education reforms 
within the strategic policy of the BRI are key elements to understanding China’s current 
economic growth and its global hegemony. The implementation of the “academic 
diplomacy” concept has been crucial for the sustainability of China’s higher education 
reforms when engaging with Western powers, or with European partners in this case. 
The concept also serves as a channel to achieve the desired outcomes of maintaining 
the political values, patriotic sentiment, national cohesion and uniqueness of China’s 
long-lasting culture and civilisation. 
China has implemented both “soft power” policy and “academic diplomacy” 
through its worldwide expansion of CIs, as well as academic and scientific partnerships 
with the main powers to promulgate the idea that China’s rising power does not entail 
any threat. And the BRI initiative, as a principal policy of China’s government since 
2014, serves as the main instrument for expanding global cooperation in culture, 
education and science. Through the Erasmus+ programme, CEEC academic cooperation, 
the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions or European Research Council actions within 
the Horizon 2020 or Horizon Europe programmes, EU countries have become relevant 
partners in scientific and academic exchanges with China. However, there are various 
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opinions regarding the internationalisation of China’s academic institutions among 
government officials and academic bodies. In reality, current patriotic discourses and 
a reversal to nationalism seem to contradict the internationalisation and reform of 
China’s higher education system. Patriotic or national discourses shaped by the 
“internationalisation with Chinese characteristics” policy and narrative may be seen 
as contradictory to the internationalisation concept. “Internationalisation with Chinese 
characteristics” has indeed strengthened China’s framework and schemes in its national 
model of education and research system, which have diverged from the Western model 
or international academic standards in many aspects. In short, patriotic discourses, in 
advocating non-inclusive frameworks, tend to be contradictory to the Western models 
which, on the other hand, encourage diversity by recruiting international faculty, 
adopting new labour practices to attract overseas talent and introducing an open and 
transparent peer review system. Thus, China’s officials and institutions play a crucial 
role in exercising “academic diplomacy” to legitimise its current directions and policies 
in education, culture, and the higher education system. 
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